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This comparative research contributes to the further understanding of party system 
stability in ethnically divided societies. It looks at the extent of party system institutionalization 
in Lithuania and Latvia by paying attention to the variance of party system stability over time. 
Differences in party system stability over time are a consequence of the extent of the ideological 
balance within the party system and the success of coalition governments. The salience of 
ethnicization of the party system and the design of the electoral system matter. This is because 
both heavily influence the effectiveness of both the existence of ideological balancers and 
coalition retention over time.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value 
and stability” (Huntington 1968, 12). While party-system institutionalization is a means of a 
“commitment to an organization and to some minimal collective goals (especially winning 
elections); it requires loyalty beyond allegiance to a single leader” (Mainwaring 1998, 70-71). 
More institutionalized party systems can be defined as having greater party system stability in 
terms of patterns of competition manifested through regularity (Mainwaring 1998, 69). In 
addition, they also have stronger roots in society, political actors give legitimacy to the party 
system, and party organizations acquire independent status and value of their own (Mainwaring 
and Torcal 2006, 206-207). Within a more institutionalized party system, there is consistency in 
terms of who the main parties are and how they behave within the political arena. Within a more 
weakly institutionalized system this becomes less clear.  
I seek to explore the extent of party system institutionalization in Lithuania and Latvia by 
looking at the variance of party system stability over time. The differences in party system 
stability over time are a consequence of the extent of ideological balance within the party system 
and the success of coalition governments over time. Both are shaped by the extent of how salient 
the ethnicization of the party system is and the electoral system, and thus either exacerbate party 
system instability or make a party system more stable.  The extent of ideological balance among 
the parties within a system is one indicator of party system stability applicable to the party 
systems of Lithuania and Latvia. I argue that the more the system is likely to have “genuine” 
ideological balancers within it the more stable the party system is. In addition, the salience of 
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ethnicization of the party system helps explain party system stability in terms of its effect on the 
party dispersion within the system and thus the alternatives available to voters. Hence, the more 
salient the party system ethnicization is within the party system the dispersion of parties is more 
rigid. Further, the design of the electoral system impacts party system stability when it interacts 
with the ethnic geography, in the context of ethnically divided societies. Lastly, evidence from 
my research shows that effective coalition retention, while taking in account party system 
characteristics of the both countries tends to stabilize the party system. The impact of such 
stabilization is more pronounced in party systems where the degree and salience of party system 
ethnicization is greater.  
The first section explains the reasons why it is important to compare the party system 
stability of Lithuania and Latvia. In the second section, I review the various ways scholars have 
approached party system stability and explore the potential role of ethnicity, electoral design, and 
cleavage structures in party system stability. Thirdly, I analyze the empirical evidence in light of 
my hypothesis that the differences in party system stability over time are a consequence of the 
extent of ideological balance within the party system and the success of coalition governments 
over time. Both of which are highly impacted by the degree and salience of ethnicization of the 
party system and the design of the electoral system. Lastly, I conclude my discussion with the 
implications of this research in the wider context of party system research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CASE SELECTION 
 
Lithuania and Latvia prove as important comparative research in terms of party system 
stability in the context of ethnically divided societies. I will begin by outlining the similarities, 
first, both countries share a recent historical past of being part of the former Soviet Union. Both 
countries successfully democratized together with Estonia in comparison to other post-Soviet 
states in the region such as Belarus and Ukraine that still remain problematic. Successful 
political democratization was also accompanied by successful economic reforms and both states 
are now members of NATO and the European Union. To compare the party systems of the two 
countries over time would allow to see the variable nuance of party system stability from entirely 
its beginning. Nationhood is not new for both of the countries. Lithuanian nationhood has existed 
historically as a form of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later a part of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. Latvia’s first independent statehood experience occurred during the interwar 
period. The interwar period was an experience of both democracy and dictatorship for both of the 
countries. In Latvia the relatively short dictatorship of Karlis Ulmanis and in Lithuania the 
dictatorship of Antanas Smetona that lasted thirteen years. The party system disappeared and the 
Lithuanian Nationalist Union became the only party allowed in government. For both Lithuania 
and Latvia dictatorship ended with the incorporation into the Soviet Union. Currently, both 
countries can be considered relatively new democracies in the post-Soviet period. Together with 
wholly new party systems. This is because, for example, minor parties that survived in Lithuania 
such as the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party and the Lithuanian Nationalist Union in the 
post-Soviet political sphere have not played an important role in the new party system. The 
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parties and interests of the interwar period for both countries were replaced by new dominant 
parties and new emergent interests in the post-Soviet period.  
Secondly, both countries share another similarity of being ethnically divided societies.  
This ethnic division is naturally translated into ethnic cleavages whom then are expressed within 
the party system. In Latvia, ethnic Russians and other Slav Russian speakers constitute the 
largest minority group and are a relatively important political force among the electorate. The 
minorities in Latvia, in comparison to Lithuania, tend to be more geographically dispersed across 
Latvia. In Lithuania, the Poles constitute the largest minority group, but they are strongly 
concentrated in the southeastern region of Lithuania. The Latgale region of Latvia always had a 
Russian population, but the Russian influx increased overall during the Soviet period. This 
allowed for a wider dispersion of the Russian population across Latvia and currently as a greater 
political force within the current party system. Lithuania is historically a multiethnic state with 
the Lithuanian-Poles constituting an important minority group.  
The third similarity for the both countries is that of the party systems. Aside from being 
relatively new party systems and ethnically divided societies, both share relatively unstable party 
systems (Pabriks and Stokenberga 2006 and Ramonaite 2006). The measures of party system 
instability are discussed at length in the next section, however, both countries tend to see a high 
number of competitors, high electoral volatility, fragmentation, high party extinction, 
underdevelopment of organizational structure by the parties within the system. These variables 
occurring simultaneously tend to impact party system stability. It is thus important to compare 
the two countries over time in regard to party system stability as to seek the causes of a greater or 
a lesser extent of party system stability under differing environmental circumstances.  
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Furthermore, there are different environmental circumstances that have occurred in 
Lithuania and Latvia under the similar context of both being relatively new party systems, 
ethnically divided societies, and both being characterized as more or less unstable party systems. 
These environmental differences include, first, the difference in the degree and salience of the 
ethnicization of the party system. Second, the difference in the ideological system balance. 
Third, the difference in the electoral system of the two countries. The difference in the degree 
and salience of the ethnicization of the party system comes in part from historical events, such as 
the experience under the Soviet Union. The experience drastically altered Lithuanian and Latvian 
demographic dynamics. This has left an imprint on the salient societal issues in Latvia especially 
in terms of the question of ethnic minorities, such as citizenship and language policy. In 
Lithuania, ethnic minority issues are less salient in terms of having a high impact on the party 
system as in Latvia. Partly because ethnic minorities in Lithuania constitute less of a population 
proportion, but also because ethnic minorities have been welcomed in Lithuania as political 
citizens at the inception of independence in 1991, in contrast to Latvia (Pabriks and Stokenberga 
2006, 52-54). This has in a way helped alleviate group tensions in Lithuania.  
That is why the salience in terms of ethnic dimensions is important because as Horowitz 
points out that party systems with ethnic and nonethnic parties indicate a prevalence of more 
than one issue dimension (Horowitz 1995, 303). For example, the Latvian ethnic dimension of 
the party system is more salient because the system is mainly based on an ethnicized division of 
parties. The ethnic societal division hence becomes mediated by politics that then impact the 
party system stability. The Latvian left is primarily represented by Russian minority parties 
(Saarts 2011, 93). Leaving the ethnic Latvians to mainly support parties which occupy the 
centre-right. In Lithuania the salience of the ethnic dimension is less to an extent because the 
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system includes a variety of ethnic and nonethnic parties spanning the ideological continuum. 
Another important point is that because of the more salient ethnic effect in Latvia coalition 
formation for the mostly Russian minority party has been unsuccessful while in Lithuania the 
party of the Lithuanian-Poles were able to join the governing coalition.  
The second difference between the two countries is the difference in ideological balance 
among the party systems. Because the ethnic salience is less important in Lithuania and the fact 
that former communist elites were able to retain power post 1990 Supreme Soviet elections, we 
see a “genuine” ideological divide between the main parties in Lithuania in the 1990’s. This has 
granted Lithuania a sense of party system stability at that time. The story in Latvia differs, in that 
because the ethnic divide is much more salient as the division has been rigidly politicized in 
terms of ideological dimensions, we see no “genuine” ideological divide in Latvia. The divide 
between the parties is ethnic on what traditionally is understood as in terms of the ideological 
left-right continuum. Lastly, the third difference is the electoral system that theoretically impacts 
party system stability. Latvia uses a proportional representation (PR) open-list system while 
Lithuania uses a mixed (SMD) and closed-list (PR) system. A comparison of the two countries is 
important in terms of testing the strength of electoral system design on the party system stability 
in Lithuania and Latvia that share important similarities.  
In conclusion, in order to see the variance in party system stability over time in Lithuania 
and Latvia, it is important to compare the two countries that share important similarities and 
differences. Both countries are newly emergent party systems, both are ethnically divided 
societies, and both are relatively unstable party systems. The differences between the two 
countries come in, in regard to, the degree and salience of the ethnicization of the party system, 
the difference in ideological balance among the party systems, and the difference in the electoral 
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system utilized. To see how and why the party system stability varies across the two countries 
over time, we have a perfect testing ground. This is because such an analysis offers an almost 
experiment like situation. In which we incubate the two new party systems from inception and 
analyze it over time. The two systems share an ethnically divided character, but most importantly 
differ in the extent of degree and salience of the ethnicization of the party system. The two 
systems are also characterized by party system instability, but at the same time differ in structure 
of the electoral system.  
It is imperative to look at the measures of party system instability in the context of the 
different degree and salience of the ethnicization of the party system within similarly ethnically 
divided societies. This is important granted it would theoretically show how powerful is the 
salience effect of ethnicization in already ethnically divided societies. We look at the differences 
in the electoral system to see if it has a powerful impact on party system stability, within the 
context of how salient is the ethnicization of the party system. The two countries also differ in 
the extent of the ideological balance of the system one, Latvia, being it lacks a “genuine” 
ideological balance outside of its ethnicized structure, and Lithuania whose system can be 
characterized as having a “genuine” ideological balance, not distorted by an ethnic divide. All of 
these variables can help us explain party system stability. This is important granted in order to 
see how the salience of the ethnic divide, ideological balance, and electoral rules impact the 
variance of party system stability in Lithuania and Latvia. Such a set up may will contribute 
toward further understanding of the variables that may cause party system stability or instability 
in ethnically divided societies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY AND MEASURES OF PARTY SYSTEM STABILITY 
 
This section overviews the theory and measures used by scholars in regard to party 
system stability. First, I begin with the ways in which scholars measure party system stability. 
One such way in in terms of measuring electoral volatility. It is one of the essential measures of 
party system stability. It is defined as the “net change within the electoral party system resulting 
from individual vote transfers” (Pedersen 1979, 6). Thus, party system stability depends on vote 
transfers between two consecutive elections. Powell and Tucker make an important distinction 
between two types of volatility, first being what they call Type B volatility which is the switch of 
votes between existing parties and, the second one being Type A which is the volatility that 
occurs due to entry and exit of new parties. They attribute Type A volatility to greater party 
system instability, while Type B volatility is seen as healthy for a representative democracy 
(Powell and Tucker 2013, 2). Because a more stable party system is that which has a more 
consistent stability in terms of who the main political actors are. With new parties coming and 
leaving the party system, the party system overall tends to be more unstable and hence may 
constitute a lesser extent of institutionalization.  
Similarly, Granberg and Holmberg find that certain levels of volatility are normal for a 
democracy (1990). They find that in Sweden the changes in voter preference had nothing to do 
with low voter knowledge, in contrast to the US where low knowledge individuals were more 
likely to switch votes. Lane and Errson suggest that a moderate level of party system instability, 
whose key dimensions include volatility and fractionalization, may be an important component 
for democracies (Lane and Errson 2007, 95). This is because voters may punish incumbents who 
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have become ineffective as representatives. Furthermore, Lane and Errson conclude when 
comparing eastern and western volatility that both will continue to experience differing levels of 
volatility (Lane and Errson 2007). Party system instability is more likely to be higher in post-
1978 competitive party systems (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007), such as the post-Soviet and post-
Communist states as well as Latin American states. In part due to the newness of the 
democracies, however, volatility in western democracies may question the strength of such a 
causal claim as a sole explanation.  
Further, I explore the theories of party system instability. I will begin with explaining the 
sources of party system instability that scholars have set forth as potential explanations as to the 
causes of party system stability and its possible instability. For example, Mair (2000) explains 
instability in terms of the openness of the party system. Such as the ease with which new parties 
may enter the system for competition. On the other hand, Tavits (2008), Bartolini and Mair 
(1999), and Pedersen (1979) link party system fluidity to the number of parties within the 
system. Under the assumption that the more parties there are, the greater the choice, and thus the 
more likely the votes will swing among the parties. This causes party system instability to an 
extent that shifts in government composition may impact policy choice and policy effectiveness. 
In contrast, Sikk (2005) finds that party system instability in Eastern Europe exists due to the 
inner dynamics of incumbents and does not come from the rise of new contenders. This means 
that actors already within the party system are likely to switch party allegiances or create new 
parties as an attempt to stay in power. Such actions again shift the votes and voter attention 
toward new parties creating greater party system instability.  
Another explanation for instability is offered by Roberts and Wibbels (1999) and Roberts 
(2007) who give credence to the argument that economic voting impacts high volatility and thus 
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overall party system instability in the region. This occurs when the electorate punishes 
incumbents through economic voting. When the voters are dissatisfied with the economy they 
are more likely to vote out the incumbent government. Overall, high party system instability is 
found in the post-communist region as indicated by the volatility measure (Bernhard and 
Karakoc 2011, Bielasiak 2002, Pettai and Kreuzer 1999). In terms of the Baltics specifically, the 
length of non-democracy and supply side volatility explains the high party system instability 
(Kuklys 2013). Partly this goes in hand with the argument set out by Mainwaring and Zoco that 
new democracies tend to be more volatile. In addition, high supply side volatility comes from 
new contenders in the political sphere. These new contenders may either be genuinely new to 
politics or old timers who have changed allegiances or strategy. Such when politicians leave their 
own parties to join or create entirely new parties.  
Scholars also analyze party system institutionalization and the extent of its stability 
theoretically based on the particular characteristics of the parties in the system. They look at the 
organizational and the institutional rules of the parties in the system, formation of the party 
system, and the politicized divisions within the system. Certain types of parties are better for the 
stabilization of the party system such as programmatic over charismatic or clientelistic 
(Kitsechelt 1995). Mainly because programmatic parties tend seek organizational structure 
around the common good of society as whole, rather than depending to gain support by 
patronage or the focus on the ideology of the leader. Party systems that contain more 
programmatic parties, are not only able to better organize and sustain societal roots over time, 
but also strongly contribute to party system stability overall.  
Also, parties regardless of organization face differing incentives in terms of different 
institutional settings Strom (1999). In essence, under different electoral systems parties within 
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the system will shift their behavior. This is done to maximize their vote potential within the 
system. To this extent Tavits finds that institutional choices affect party system stability (2005), 
and that new parties are more likely to enter when costs are low (2008). The ability of new 
parties to easily enter the party system as relevant contenders means that party system instability 
may increase. This supports the supply side argument of party system instability. Tavits also 
finds that survival of the political parties is based on their organizational structure (2013). This is 
important granted party extinction contributes toward higher party system instability. As parties 
are unable to find viable organizational structures over time they are more likely to lose support, 
hence allowing an open window for new parties to enter the party system and try their luck.   
Two changes happen in regard to democratization as a party system begins the process of 
party system institutionalization. First the citizens are included in the selection of leaders second 
there is an establishment of accountability among the leadership chosen through the democratic 
mechanism (Birch 2003: 4). Parties then “serve as the procedural and institutional instruments 
for creating a competitive political environment” (Krupavicius 1998, 6). The stability of the 
party system then under such conditions depends on the normalization in terms of consistency of 
party competition as shown by party system stability. This includes stability in regards to who 
the main contenders are, the occurrence of regular elections, and the general attention to the 
established electoral rules.  
Yet, another way of looking at party system instability is to pay attention to the voter and 
the impact that the voters may have on the party system overall. Birch suggests that strategic 
voting should increase as party loyalties increase (Birch 2003, 84). This is because higher levels 
of system wide instability may indicate competence and the genuine exercise of choice among 
the voters (Birch 2003, 133). This may occur in the context of economic factors and ethnic 
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cleavage structures, as well as the choices of parties available. In addition, strategic voting 
increases as voters become more experienced (Tavits and Annus 2006). In a 1995 study, 
Reisinger, Miller, and Hesli found that former Soviet citizens were highly participatory. 
Likewise, this is an important component of civil society for a healthy democracy (Reisinger. 
Miller, and Hesli 1995, 942). While Dalton notes that in advanced industrial democracies there is 
a rise in sophisticated individuals lacking party ties (Dalton 1984) this hence has led to greater 
party system instability. Due to voters more likely shifting their votes to new parties. In the same 
light interested nonpartisans were found to be overrepresented among intention-behavior 
changers (Granberg and Holmberg 1990), again promoting system instability. Higher 
competence, participation, and strategic voting by the electorate garners greater party system 
instability because the choices of the voters lack consistency. This lack of voter consistency then 
causes variance in the levels of party system stability.  
Theoretically the stability of the party system also depends greatly on the cleavage 
structures in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Politization of cleavages beyond the original 
cleavage structures set out by Lipset and Rokkan in new democracies differs remarkably. 
Especially in ethnically divided societies such as Lithuania and Latvia. This is because the ethnic 
structure in such societies can become politicized, the post-communist transition itself provided 
an opportunity for activation of ethnic conflict (Bochsler 2007, 6). This is important granted that 
Latvia is more heterogeneous than Lithuania, thus allowing for a differing inception of party 
system competition to emerge. Ethnic cleavages play an important role in shaping party system 
stability, but to a different extent due to demographic variation especially as such is mediated by 
politics. In more heterogeneous countries the salience of ethnic cleavages can be greater, thus 
causing greater party instability. This is partly because in ethnically divided societies the ethnic 
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parties tend garner their support from their own group (Horowitz 1985, 344). This impedes 
natural voter choice based on ideological party stance, as each voter tends to vote for parties that 
represent their own group. Such is a centrifugal system where floating voters are not situated 
between parties (Horowitz 1985, 348). Determinant of party support tends to be ones ethnicity 
(Horowitz 1985, 298). Under different circumstances, especially based on the degree and 
salience of importance in regard to the ethnicized party system, a party system may become more 
or less stable. If ethnic minorities tend to vote for their own group party, then the choice for 
titular citizens ranges in terms of the variety of other available parties within the system. The 
interplay between the ethnic minority and titular parties, in such a context, impacts party system 
stability. The degree to which this occurs depends on the extent to which the ethnic cleavage 
divide is emphasized on the societal level. In short, the salience of the ethnic cleavage matters.  
Furthermore, in order to capture the extent of the degree and the salience of the 
ethnicized party system and its underlying stability, it is important to pay attention to the 
electoral system simultaneously. For example, a PR system tends to be much more viable for 
ethnic parties to win seats (Moser 2005, 113). This is because under proportional representation, 
especially within an open-list system that allows the voter to choose a specific individual within 
the party, greater system instability, as I will argue, proliferates party system instability. This 
happens to be especially the case under circumstances of electoral punishment and the 
availability of new parties as it is easier to get elected under such a system. On the other hand in 
more homogenous societies, not only is the importance of an ethnicization of the party system 
less salient impacting party system stability, but at the same type the electoral system combined 
with the salience effect either exacerbates or calms party system instability. For example, an 
SMD closed-list system tends to be less viable for ethnic minorities, unless ethnic minorities are 
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highly concentrated demographically (Moser 2006, 113). So ethnic minorities have a greater 
chance to win votes in highly concentrated minority regions only. While under a PR open-list 
system a minority candidate has a greater chance of winning overall, when the two electoral 
systems are compared.   
Ideological cleavage structures within a system have an impact in determining party 
system stability and how institutionalized the party system is. Zielinski regards a system that is 
frozen in a sense that it must persist over time and that voting patterns are stable over a sequence 
of elections (Zielinski 2002, 193). Such can be created by parties in the system that attune the 
interests of electorate in terms of the societal cleavages available to them by evading party 
extinction and contributing toward party system stabilization. It means they may lose some seats 
in parliament or move to become opposition government, but nevertheless, will tend to stay 
within the political arena over time. Ideological cleavages are just one means of such party 
system stabilization. For example, a loss of an ideological cleavage can be explained by the 
theory set forth by Agh (1995) in terms of the occurrence of early freezing, that only later is 
continued by a long and structural adaptation of emerging interests. This means that newly 
institutionalizing systems may experience a period of party system stability. Such stability is 
especially achieved under a centripetal system that in essence mirrors a two-party system 
(Horowitz 1985, 347). The stability of the party system is not ultimate because as mentioned 
above due to the growth of strategic voting and the increasing competence of voters allows for 
the emergence of new cleavages and interests among the electorate. A dealignment in regard to 
cleavage structures is cause of instability in terms of the whole party system under analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
The election data utilized for my analysis comes from the Central Election Commission 
of Latvia and Lithuania. The purpose of the measures is to compare and contrast overall party 
system stability in Lithuania and Latvia. To do this I reject the dichotomous categories used by 
Sartori of party systems and non-systems (Sartori 1976, 244-8) and instead utilize the assumption 
set out by Mainwaring and Torcal of institutionalization as a continuum (Mainwaring and Torcal 
2006, 205). This will allow to see nuanced variance in terms of changes in regard to party system 
stability over time. Due to the fluctuations of the two main explanations for party system stability 
for Lithuania and Latvia – the first being the degree of ideological balance in the party system 
and the success of coalition governments over time. Overall, I will measure eight predictive 
variables to look at party system stability over time.  
For my measures, I utilized indicators as set out by Lindberg (2007), it is important to 
include more than one of these indicators to measure the stability of the system granted that these 
individual indicators cannot give us the whole picture in regard to party system stability. In 
addition, to Lindberg’s measures I added the number of competing parties in each election, this 
measure is important because it shows the legitimacy of the party system in terms of how many 
parties are willing to compete come elections. This gives a sense of how open a party system is. 
The other measures are the number of parties in the legislature, if the number tends to fluctuate it 
indicates a more so fluid party system. The number of new parties in parliament in essence 
shows how easy it is for new parties to win, the more likely that new parties come in 
government, the more so the system is unstable. Then the percentage of the new parties in 
16 
 
 
 
parliament is calculated from the number of overall parties in the parliament. I also calculate the 
number of parties voted out, it is an important measure granted the more parties are voted out the 
greater the system fluidity. Before calculating seat volatility I will look at the percentage of 
parliament occupied by the largest party and the runner-up, this is done to ensure that once we 
take in context that whether or not a new party is able to amass the majority vote, it may then 
indicate party system fluidity (Lindberg 2007, 224). Lastly I will calculate legislative seat 
volatility using the Pedersen index.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS 
 
This section will incorporate the measures of party system stability into my argument that 
the differences in party system stability over time are a consequence of the extent of ideological 
balance within the party system and the success of coalition governments over time. In addition, 
to the degree and salience of ethnicization of the party system and the design of the electoral 
system both of which effect the strength of ideological balance and coalition retention. I begin 
with the first elections in the two countries in order to understand the emergence of what I call a 
"genuine" ideological cleavage in Lithuania and not in Latvia. This section will show how the 
occurrence of the ideological balance in Lithuania had stabilized the party system. Once the 
ideological balance was lost the Lithuanian party system instability increased. In Latvia, the 
party system was less stable and it lacked and continues to lack a “genuine” ideological balance. 
Nevertheless, recent retention of coalitions over times have shown increasing party system 
stability. The essential starting point for the analysis begins with the Supreme Soviet elections of 
1990 for the both countries.  
The Supreme Soviet elections in Lithuania and Latvia occurred in 1990 with the 
communist parties competing with the new anti-communists. The main opponents in Lithuania 
were the independent candidates endorsed by Sajudis and the Communist Party of Lithuania. The 
new opposition, Sajudis, was successful because of its mass mobilization. Similarly, the Latvian 
Popular Front in Latvia, was made up of individuals not entirely new to politics. As in Lithuania, 
sixty percent of the leadership of Sajudis in 1998 were members of the Communist Party of 
Lithuania, in addition, many communists participated in the activities of Sajudis as well 
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(Janusauskiene 2002, 232). In fact both sides of the spectrum the KLP and Sajudis were not 
homogenous in their ideological stance. The LDDP, that later evolved from the communist party 
within embraced social democratic and liberal positions (Janusauskiene 2002, 232-234). The 
differences between the KLP and Sajudis became polarized as Sajudis radicalized, while the 
KPL endorsed a step by step approach toward independence. In this regard, what I call the 
“genuine” ideological cleavage emerged in Lithuania, because the old communist versus the new 
liberal dynamic remained, where in Latvia the old communists were defeated and never returned 
to hold significant power splintering into smaller less significant minority parties. The initial 
Latvian party system, in contrast to Lithuania, somewhat mirrored the tabula rasa argument 
(Shabad and Slomczynski 1999) of party system institutionalization. Mainly because of the 
overall “newness” of the participating parties within the system.  
The policies of the KLP under the Soviet Union allowed for an important legacy in 
Lithuania, a legacy that differed remarkably in terms of comparison with Latvia. The leadership 
promoted a Lithuanization policy, it first allowed for prestigious but less powerful posts for those 
emissaries from Moscow and the more important roles to local communists, but most 
importantly it employed local and rural populations to build industries, thus reducing the flow of 
Russian population (Janusauskiene 2002, 227). In 1989, native Lithuanians made up 79.4% of 
total population, in Latvia native Latvians made up 52%, this is in stark contrast to historical 
numbers in 1939-41 native Lithuanians in Lithuania comprised 69.1-71% and in 1959, 79.3%. 
While in 1935 native Latvians made up 75.7% (Janusauskiene 2002, 239). At the same time 
membership of LDDP in terms of Lithuanians in 1989 was at 70.7%. There was in addition 
compromise and participation among the elites of the communist party and Sajudis (Zeruolis 
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1998, 122). With the Sajudis members being more radical in terms of the question of 
independence, while the communists preferred a more moderate approach.  
In the 1990 Latvian election the Latvian Popular Front won 68.2% of the votes while the 
Latvian Communist Party took second place with 21.5% of the vote. Interestingly, demographic 
determinism did not occur, granted that the minorities in Latvia are proportionally significant, 
the communist party lost nevertheless. The difference in election outcomes created a pertinent 
ideological cleavage structure that allowed Lithuania a sense of party system stability in the 
1990’s. This pertinent ideological divide being a communist versus liberal one. Where the 
Lithuanian communists were able to organize and remain a viable political force beyond the 
1990 election, in Latvia the communists lost any significant political power and fragmented into 
smaller minority parties. 
The elections of 1993 for Latvia and 1992 for Lithuania showed an emergence of a 
pattern that contributes to the variance of stability for both party systems. The pattern in Latvia is 
one characterized by the fact that the “new” party is able to attain the largest vote share.  The 
first occurrence was in the 1993 Latvian election, where the Latvian Way took first place. The 
“new” party was formed by the former activists of the Popular Front. While the Popular Front 
itself did not even pass the 4% barrier (Karklins and Zepa 2007, 337). This loss was partly 
accounted for by the deteriorating living standards and increasing economic gap between social 
groups (Smith-Siversten 1998, 98). Although, in Lithuania Sajudis did lose the second election to 
the communist offspring – the LDDP, Sajudis remained in opposition, thus establishing a bipolar 
environment for the next eight years in Lithuanian politics. This to an extent worked to diminish 
party system fluidity especially in comparison to the Latvian system and create greater societal 
roots for the parties within the bipolar system. With the creation of such party roots, it naturally 
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meant that party organizations would become more sophisticated. Evading further possibility of 
party extinction in the future. This explains why the two main offshoots of the “genuine” 
ideological divide in the 1990’s still remain to this day as viable political contenders in the form 
of Homeland Union and the Social Democrats.  
Sajudis disintegrated before the 1992 election in Lithuania, this was caused due to the 
emergence of new groups such as Lithuanian Liberal Union and the Independence Party 
(Novagrockiene 2001, 145). It was such party fragmentation of the left that also then resulted in 
a loss for the LDDP party in 1996, in 2000 the LDDP formed a coalition with LSDP, but failed 
to form a government thus remained in opposition. Novagrockiene attributes organizational 
failings of Sajudis in the 1992 election, as it was forced into the opposition. She also notes that 
Sajudis failure in the second election is important in such extent as it created a system marked by 
“distinct fragmentation of political forces with several parties and movements distributed along 
the left-right spectrum” (Novagrockiene 2001, 147). This did not occur in Latvia as the initial 
contenders in the first election were gone by the second and wholly new parties participated in 
the 1993 election. This novelty of the parties in the system further exacerbates party system 
fluidity.  
Novagrockiene further continues that victory for the LDDP oriented the Lithuanian 
political parties more toward programmatic and ideological goals, in essence it allowed them to 
shift concern toward becoming “vote maximizing” parties (Novagrockiene 2001, 147). Because 
such was not the case in Latvia, the Lithuanian party system had an upper hand in terms of party 
system stabilization at least initially. Latvia lacked a dichotomy of stable dominant parties. 
Allowing for newcomers to emerge during each election cycle more frequently and thus allowing 
them to easier win over the incumbents because of electoral punishment especially because of 
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economic voting. The lack of stable dominant parties thus increased party system fluidity in such 
a way as shown by the percentage of new parties in the Saeima in the first four election above 
the fifty percent mark. Making the overall average for all of the elections ten percent higher than 
the percentage average of new parties in Lithuania. Indicating greater party system fluidity in 
Latvia overall. 
For the elections of 1996 for Lithuania and 1995 for Latvia, two pertinent issues 
remained for both of the countries – the economy and its political orientation. The political 
orientation in terms of the debate between NATO and Russia took second in terms of the concern 
for the economy in both countries. Disillusionment with the previous government in both 
countries impacted the voter choices in these elections. The LDDP was blamed for economic 
stagnation and fiscal scandals lost to the Homeland Union. While in Latvia the parties who took 
part in the 1995 election were fluid in principles and platforms, nevertheless, “those who could 
be identified most closely with the perceived failures of government to improve the economic 
life suffered substantial losses” (Davies and Ozolins 2012, 126). In Latvia for the second election 
in the row now in 1993 and 1995, the parties that won stressed socioeconomic issues (Smith-
Siversten 1998, 98). In terms of the overall winners and losers of this election, the government 
was formed with over half of deputies who had no experience in government (Davies and 
Ozolins 2012, 128). This was especially the case since, again, the wholly new Democratic Party 
Saimnieks won the majority, causing an increase in party system instability.  In the Lithuanian 
case, although, new parties did emerge the “old” parties remained in government successfully. 
Anchoring greater overall party system stability. This is because legitimate ruling parties 
emerged in the Lithuanian system (Krupavicius 1997, 548), this was not the case in Latvia, no 
ruling parties emerged nor did a turnover of power occur.  
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Table 1: Party System Stability/Fluidity in Latvia  
Latvia  Total 
Competing 
In 
Saeima 
New 
Parties  
(%) New 
Parties 
Saeima 
Parties 
Voted Out  
(%) Voted 
Out 
(%) Saeima 
Seats by 
Largest 
Party 
(%) Saeima 
Seats by 
runner-up 
1993 23 8 8 100 2 100 36 15 
1995 19 9 6 66 4 50 18 16 
1998 21 6 3 50 6 66 24 21 
2002 20 6 4 66 4 66 26 25 
2006 19 7 1 14 0 0 23 18 
2010 13 5 2 40 5 71 33 29 
2011 13 5 1 20 1 20 31 22 
2014 13 6 2 33 1 20 24 23 
Average 17.6 6.5 3.4 48.6 2.9 49.1 26.9 21.1 
 
In summary, in regard to party system stability in both countries in the 1990's we can see 
clear similarities such as high number of parties in competition and a high number of new parties 
in parliament. This is understandable granted the parties within the system lacked organizational 
roots and stability that would allow to evade party extinction. The percentage of new parties is 
bigger, granted not significantly bigger, in Latvia partly due to the lack of stable left-right 
ideological parties that characterized the Lithuanian party system. Thus the “genuine” 
ideological cleavage in Lithuania allowed for a more stable party system in comparison to 
Latvia. This is further shown by a higher percentage of parties voted out in Latvia when 
compared to Lithuania. There is a higher overall difference between the percentages of seats in 
Lithuania where the winner is most likely to win a majority, while in Latvia the parties are more 
likely to be evenly spread out. So while seat volatility in Latvia is mainly caused by new parties 
coming onto the scene and then never returning come next election. In Lithuania greater seat 
volatility is caused by the turnover of power between the ideological parties.  
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Table 2: Party System Stability/Fluidity in Lithuania  
Lithuania  Total 
Competing 
In 
Seimas 
New 
Parties 
(%) New 
Parties in 
Seimas 
Parties 
Voted Out 
(%) Voted 
Out 
(%) Seats by 
Largest 
Party in 
Seimas 
(%) Seats 
by runner-
up in 
Seimas 
1992 20 8 6 75 4 57 51 21 
1996 29 15 7 46 2 25 51 11 
2000 15 7 1 14 8 53 24 20 
2004 20 7 3 42 1 14 27 17 
2008 16 10 4 40 1 14 31 17 
2012 18 8 1 12 2 20 27 23 
Average 19.7 9.2 3.7 38.2 3 30.5 35.2 18.2 
 
The analysis indicates that system wide fluidity is overall stronger in Latvia because of 
the lack of anchoring from "genuine" ideological balancers that allowed greater system stability 
in Lithuania. Hence, the extent of party system balance within the party system impacts its 
stability. Voters are given less choice. This causes greater stability as power is shared between 
major known contenders rather than wholly new contenders within the system. It is important to 
differentiate between overall system stability versus seat volatility, as high seat volatility in 
Lithuania remained, but the party system as a whole was more stable. Lastly, coalition formation 
was not as imperative in Lithuania because the two main ideological parties were able to sustain 
majority between the turnovers. The ability of parties to win majority, due to the existence of a 
bipolar ideological environment, allowed for the difference in the outcomes of party system 
stability in Lithuania and the lack of majority parties, within the same context, for Latvia.  
 
Table 3: Seat Volatility in Latvia and Lithuania         
Latvia 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 2011 2014 Average 
 49.5 31.5 43.5 32 37 36 26 36.5 
Lithuania 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Average   
 48 60.5 38 35 22.5 40.8   
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In contrast, while ideological balancers have stabilized the Lithuanian party system, with 
the loss of these ideological balancers came greater party system instability. The 2000 election in 
Lithuania, put an end to dominance of ideologically dominant parties – the fluctuation of power 
was the main cause for party system instability, especially high seat volatility, in the 1990’s, 
nevertheless, it brought in further instability in the system overall that continues to this day. 
Clark and Prekevicius (2003) show two key issues were of concern for the parties in this election 
economic policy and the defense budget. This shows the importance of a socio-economics and 
geopolitical factors, within the historic context. Granted, that the 1990’s voter preferences were 
dominated not just by economic concerns, as seen above whence incumbent governments were 
punished for economic performance but also by the communist and anticommunist sentiment 
between the Homeland Union and the LDDP.  
In addition, the election did not produce a majority party for the first time, it allowed the 
New Politics Bloc made up of New Union, Liberal Union, Center Union, and Modern Christian 
Democratic Union to win 66 seats (Clark and Prekevicius 2003, 552). The realignment thus 
proved that the party system is not yet “frozen". The loss of the "genuine" ideological structure 
in Lithuania following the 2000 election indicates greater system fluidity in Lithuania especially 
in terms of the diminishing percentage between the majority winner party and the runner up 
party in terms of seats in Seimas. Creating greater importance for effective coalition 
governments, and the indication of increasing variance of voter choice. This goes with the theory 
set out by Agh that newly emerging interests are now being established as the “genuine” 
ideological cleavage is no longer an important concern. This dealignment hence increases the 
fluidity of the Lithuanian party system. The Lithuanian case has thus far shown the pertinent 
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impact of ideological balancers within the party system and its relationship to system wide 
stability.  
Secondly, the variance of party system stability in Lithuania and Latvia is impacted by 
the salience of ethnicization of the party system and the electoral design. Salience in this context 
means how strong does the ethnicization of the society impact the party system. The more salient 
the party system ethnicization within society the more likely the party system overall shows 
instability. The electoral design may promote either a more stable or a more unstable party 
system based on the context of how salient the ethnic division within society is. Both, 
ethnicization of the party system and its salience and electoral design interact with the 
ideological environment within the party system. In this section, I argue that the lack of 
ideological balancers in Latvia is a cause of party system instability, further, the impact is 
exacerbated by the greater salience of ethnicization versus than in Lithuania, and by the form of 
electoral design that Latvia has adopted for its party system.  
In the Latvian election of 1998, the right-wing won with the moderate conservatives 
People’s Party, Latvian Way (an offshoot of the Latvian Popular Front, the biggest winners in 
the 1993 election), and the most nationalistic party For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National 
Independence Party. Then came the left leaning parties National Harmony Party, which is one of 
the major Russian minority parties and the Latvian Social Democratic alliance, made of ethnic 
Latvians. As Pettai (2006) points out that ethnic parties have only been successful in Latvia, in 
terms of the Baltic States. These Russian minority parties occupy the place of the social 
democrats in Latvia (Saarts 2011, 93). Thus, the Russian electorate significantly more tends to 
vote for the left parties made up of Russian minority ethnic parties, while on the very right 
spectrum is the For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Conservative Party. This is 
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problematic because it creates a lot of centre-rightist and ethnically moderate parties within the 
Latvian party system (Nakai 2014, 66). As Nakai has shown that then these moderate parties 
have been under the pressure to show their loyalty toward the Latvian electorate to gain and 
retain support in elections in terms of two main issues of contention in Latvia – citizenship law 
and the language policy (Nakai 2014, 68-72). This then further polarizes the already ethnically 
divided electorate in terms of the left-right continuum in Latvia and further gives reason for 
ethnic minority parties to prosper with the Russian-speaking electorate in Latvia. The left-right 
divide in Latvia is thus not and was never ideological, but rather ethnic.  
The same ethnic divide exists in Lithuania, however, it exerts a different impact because 
of less minorities overall in Lithuania when compared to Latvia, and because of the highly 
localized small Polish population that have been historically more problematic than the Russian 
minority. In addition, institutional arrangements can further explain the difference in the 
proliferation and success of the ethnic parties in Latvia, beyond the demographic character of the 
countries. The Latvian system uses a PR system that is much more viable for ethnic parties and 
thus, has given Russian-minority parties greater success overall (Moser 2005, 113). While the 
Lithuanian system in addition to the PR uses an SMD system, which allows highly concentrated 
minorities to win seats, nevertheless they will win too few seats to play an important and 
meaningful role in government (Moser 2006, 113). Thus, the ethnic cleavages play an important 
role in shaping party system stability, but to a different extent due to demographic variation 
institutional rules on the other. 
The difference in the fates of the communist successor parties in Lithuania and Latvia has 
led to variations in terms of party system stability. Latvia has experienced greater party system 
fluidity in the early years of institutionalization without the initial freezing that Lithuania 
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experienced. The system mirrored a two party system as in the elections of 1990, 1992, and 1998 
the votes swung between the Homeland Union (as Sajudis in 1990 elections) and the Democratic 
Labour Party of Lithuania. This initial freezing of the main contenders within the ideological 
system balance in Lithuania did not last as Ramonaite in fact calls the post-2000 election a 
period of the destabilization of the party system as a result parties are much more likely to see 
themselves as 'centrist' as in the Latvian party system (Ramonaite 2006, 70 and 86). In Lithuania 
the movement is now inward toward the center as the ideologically "genuine" cleavage less 
relevant in regard to causing fluidity. In essence the two ideological opposites, the Homeland 
Union and the Social Democrats (in part a merger of the former LDDP) currently, have not been 
able to sustain majority votes and now must more heavily rely on coalition governments. The 
Latvian system has always been dependent on the centre-right parties and was never as 
ideologically polarized as the Lithuanian system. The Latvian system has always tended to rely 
to a greater extent than the Lithuanian system on coalition governments.  
The trend of party system instability in Lithuania was continued in the 2004 election. 
With the biggest single winner being the newly established Labour Party taking in 28.4% of the 
vote, due to its populist and anti-establishment stance it lacked an ideological character (Jurkynas 
2005, 773-774).  The main issue area concerned again socio-economic concerns especially for 
the rural electorate that was instrumental in the support of the new Labour Party. The coalition 
was formed by the leftists the Union of Peasants and New Democracy, Labour Party, Social 
Democrats, and the Social Liberals (Jurkynas 2005, 775). The election continued to show the 
importance of effective coalition governments and their retention in Lithuania in the more fluid 
party system post-2000 elections. By relying more on coalition governments the Lithuanian party 
system is essentially mirroring the system that Latvia had in the 1990's. This reliance on 
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coalitions is now especially more important because of now higher fragmentation that was rather 
moderate in the 1990's in Lithuania (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004, 135-137).  
The Latvian election in 2002 was characterized by a similar emergence of a new party at 
the top of the polls, with high party fragmentation. In Latvia it was the New Era party whose 
appeal most may have rested in the fact that the party did not have defectors from any other 
parties in its base. Since concerns of corruption in business and politics were salient issues 
during the elections (Davies and Ozolins 2004, 836), impacting voter choice in a powerful way. 
The coalition was formed by Latvia’s First, Green and Farmer’s Union, and For Fatherland and 
Freedom in total they controlled 55 seats in Saeima (Davies and Ozolins 2004, 839). This is 
despite the fact that Union of Political Organizations “For Human Rights in a Unites Latvia,” an 
alliance of Russian minority parties, placed second in the polls. The success of Russian minority 
parties in this case, further exemplifies the strong influence of the open-list PR system. The 
Russian minority parties continue to be successful when it comes to the polls, but not successful 
in being part of coalition government. This is because it is easier for ethnic minorities to be 
elected under the PR system, especially in part due to the fact that the Russian population is more 
significant in Latvia. The inability of the Russian parties to join coalition governments 
exemplifies the salience effect of the ethnicized party system. This is because the ethnic Latvian 
parties tend to garner their votes from ethnic Latvians, thus distancing themselves from ethnic 
minority electorate. This makes sense within an ethnically divided society because ones support 
for a party is based on birth and is only to a lesser degree based on ideology of the party 
(Horowitz 1985).  
Party system instability is also characteristic of the 2008 election in Lithuania which 
mainly focused on socio-economic issues. It brought victory to the conservative Homeland 
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Union who had taken in the Lithuanian Nationalist Union earlier in the election year and merged 
with the Christian Democrats in May of 2008, overall the party retained the most stable 
electorate (Jurkynas 2009, 330). Jurkynas finds two particular issues that have remained relevant 
in terms of party system institutionalization these are underdeveloped cleavages and the 
personalization of politics (Jurkynas 2009, 333). The Latvian parties are even more leader driven 
and temporary (Pabriks and Stokenberga 2006). This according to Saarts, is due to the fact that 
Latvia has not introduced state funding, meaning that many Latvian parties have been dominated 
by business oligarchs (Saarts 2011, 98). This is problematic because it exacerbates instability in 
terms of party system, however, there was some hope in 2006 Latvian election. The coalition 
was formed by the People’s Party, Union of Greens and Peasant’s, Latvia’s First Party/Latvian 
Way, and For Fatherland and Freedom, it was an interesting result in that it was the first coalition 
to retain power following the previous election.  
The lack of ideological balancers in Latvia is a cause of party system instability, further, 
the impact is exacerbated by the greater salience of ethnicization versus than in Lithuania, and by 
the form of electoral design that Latvia has adopted for its party system. As we have seen the 
lack of ideological balancers, or the main contenders, in Latvia has created greater party system 
instability which is exemplified by a high number of new parties winning elections and then 
loosing come next elections. In Lithuania there was a turnover between the two contenders, 
leaving the smaller parties minor roles. Seat volatility itself being caused by the turnovers in 
Lithuania, rather than the emergence of new contenders as in Latvia. Party system instability is 
further deepened by the open-list PR electoral system in Latvia, as shown by the data of the high 
number of parties in competition and a high number of new parties. The high degree and salience 
of the ethnicization in Latvia of the party system contributes to the party system instability in a 
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way as to disallow the party system to create a system of “genuine” ideological balance. This is 
because the divide in the Latvian system is highly salient to such an extent that it is divided 
ethnically and not ideologically.  
Third, the variance of party system stability in Lithuania and Latvia is impacted by the 
effectiveness of coalition retention over time. This is because when the same parties are able to 
form coalition governments over time party system stability increases as well. Especially, 
because the key parties that belong in such coalitions are the same in the current election as in 
the preceding election. This decreases the rise of new contenders who might then become part of 
a governing coalition. Coalition retention over time, again, is also impacted by the ethnicization 
of the party system as well as the electoral design. This section will analyze how coalition 
retention has impacted party system stability in Lithuania and Latvia. Both countries diverge on 
the degree of salience of ethnicization of the party system and the electoral design. This section 
will show that the impact of coalition retention impacts party system stabilization. Such an 
impact is more pronounced in party systems where the degree and salience of party system 
ethnicization is greater.  
The recent retention of coalition governments over time in Latvia has greatly reduced 
overall party system instability. The idea that party rootedness in society might be on the 
increase was shattered in the 2010 Latvian election. Newcomer the Unity party emerged as an 
electoral alliance of three right-wing parties New Era Party, Civic Union, and Society for Other 
Politics, with Harmony Centre in second place losing out only by four seats in parliament. Unity 
further has been able to remain in government for the next two elections in 2011 and 2014. The 
reason for the early 2011 election was the concern over corruption in terms of Latvian political 
parties. Harmony Centre took the most seats in this election, by gaining two seats, however was 
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not part of the coalition government, nor was the party asked to participate in government. 
Instead Unity, Zatlers Reform Party, and the National Alliance formed the coalition agreement 
(Pryce 2012, 615). The 2012 Latvian language referendum further strengthened ethnic political 
divisions, according to Lublin Harmony Centre’s support of the referendum will create further 
distrust for the party and it will unlikely be part of the government coalition in the future (Lublin 
2013, 387). The 2014 election, although highly fragmented was won by the Harmony Centre 
party by one seat and Unity came in second place. Harmony Centre was not part of the coalition, 
as the Unity, Union of Greens and Farmer’s, and the National Alliance formed the coalition 
government. This again shows how the salience of the ethnicized party system impacts coalition 
formation itself. The centre-right parties that formed the government sought to disassociate 
themselves from the Russian minority party, this is a way not to lose titular votes. Hence, the 
electoral design increases the chances of ethnic party success, but the salience of ethnicization 
stifles effective coalition retention for minority parties in Latvia.  
The last three elections in Latvia can be characterized as stabilizing in terms of lesser 
extent of fluidity and may indicate a form of “freezing” in terms of coalition retention, that has 
brought about greater party system stability as the “genuine” ideological divide has in the early 
Lithuanian elections. The ability of Unity to retain power in form of being part of a government 
coalition has brought about greater party system stability in the last two elections. In addition, 
the fact that the coalitions, in the past governments, have been formed by right-wing party – 
National Alliance and three center-right parties – Unity, Reform, and Union of Green’s and 
Farmer’s indicates the high degree and salience of an ethnicized party system. This is because 
Harmony Centre a leftist party that has been mainly associated with the Russian minority and 
ethnic issues has won the 2011 and 2014 elections, and was only second place in 2010 failed to 
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be a part of a coalition government. The high salience of the ethnicization of the party system is 
shown by the fact that ethnic determinism tends to influence voter choice. As Sikk and Bochsler 
show, ethnic minority parties and ethnic Latvian parties friendly  to the minorities such as 
Latvia’s First Party/Latvia’s Way, Harmony Center, and For Human Rights in Latvia hardly get 
any votes in ethnic Latvian areas (Sikk and Bochsler 2008, 18) while the nationalist parties get 
the majority of the votes from titular voters. Overall, party system stability is higher in Latvia, in 
which the salience of party system ethnicization is higher when compared to Lithuania. This is 
supported by data in that less parties have been in competition for the last three elections when 
compared to Lithuania, by a lower number overall of new parties in Saeima, and by the lower 
number of parties voted out during these elections.  
Similarly, the 2012 Lithuanian election can be characterized by increasing party system 
stability with it a lower seat volatility. The Social Democrats in the 2012 Lithuanian election 
formed the coalition government with the Labour Party, Order and Justice, and the Electoral 
Coalition of Poles in Lithuania. Homeland Union came in third place. The Liberal Movement 
retained its general position and only lost one seat when compared to the previous election, while 
the results of the Liberal and Center Union were so dismal that they failed to gain any seats at all 
and lost representation, clearly a shift became evident in terms of the two competing parties for 
liberalism. Overall, the programmatic party characteristics remained among the two balancers – 
the Homeland Union and the Social Democrats. This makes sense granted they have the history 
and experience, thus overall are better in party organizational structures. Ideological concerns 
have shifted into mainly socio-economic concerns, while a similar ethnic division remain in 
Lithuania as in Latvia, except it is less relevant due to demographic numbers and institutional 
rules. The salience of the ethnicization of the party system is lesser in Lithuania to an extent as 
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specifically, although rather controversial in the media, the Poles joined the governing coalition. 
The success of the Poles is partly due to the electoral design that allows highly concentrated 
minorities to win seats, Lithuania uses a mixed SMD and closed-list PR system. This election 
proved to be rather stable as well, but to a different extent. The number of competing parties had 
risen and while simultaneously the number of parties elected in Seimas had lowered by two. In 
addition, the number of new parties had fallen by three. Lastly, the difference between the 
amount of votes by the winner and the runner is as low as in the 2000 election, indicating party 
system instability. At the same time seat volatility has decreased since the last election.  
Fourth, I will now review my argument in the context of my analysis in more general 
terms in order to highlight the main causes of party system variance in Lithuania and Latvia. The 
analysis of the party system stability in both Lithuania and Latvia in terms of the main predictors 
of ideological cleavages and retention of coalition governments share similarities and 
differences. We can conclude that the Lithuanian party system is more of a “frozen” party system 
because the two ideological balancers have remained over time. The balance was disturbed in the 
2000 election, but the main ideological opponents have remained. The analysis shows that there 
has been fluidity over time in terms of how stable overall the party system is for both countries. 
Common issues with party system instability such as seat volatility, party extinction, high 
fragmentation, lack of ideologically stable parties, personalistic leaders, weak organizational 
structure, institutional rules, and the ethnic divide impact the party systems at different levels. 
The important difference between the two countries is the lack of ideological turnover in Latvia 
that occurred in Lithuania in the 1990's. This led to a different outcome in terms of 
institutionalization itself. The "genuine" ideological cleavage in Lithuania was not strong enough 
to be sustained, granted new interests of the voters emerged as a trend post-2000 elections. The 
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establishment of stable cleavages within a party system moved back to the drawing board. As a 
result retention of coalitions has increased in importance in recent years. While for Latvia the 
system was initially very fluid, nevertheless, the results of effective coalition retention have now 
emerged in the recent elections, in terms of both overall party system stability and individual seat 
volatility.  
The difference in party system stability in Latvia and Lithuania can be explained by the 
ideological balance of the system and coalition government retention. The need for such parties 
for the significantly influential Russian population in Latvia has arisen because of the high 
degree and salience of the ethnicized party system. This is partly because of the rigidity of the 
ethnically divided societies where ones ethnicity decides ones politics. The reason of Russian 
minority party success can be attributed partly to the electoral system. As a result, with ethnic 
minorities voting for the left-Russian parties, the titular citizens tend to vote for the many parties 
available to them such as nationalist right and centre-right parties. The convergence in terms of 
centre-right parties vying for voters, hence, contributing to greater seat volatility and system 
wide fluidity. This exacerbates party system instability. This was especially the case in the early 
elections, in the last two elections we have seen emergence and continuance of successful 
coalition partners on both the left-right spectrum, hence, reducing seat volatility. The reduction 
of seat volatility is not enough as a measure by itself for us to conclude of the stability of the 
overall party system. That is why we also rely on the other seven measures in the data set that 
does confirm this for the Latvian case that system wide fluidity has more or less stabilized, with 
the exception of highly fragmented seats. In Lithuania, ethnic minorities are more likely to vote 
for the left parties, but so are Lithuanians. This is in part due to the “genuine” ideological 
cleavage created by the left and right parties within which the interests of the titular citizens were 
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incorporated. At the same time the fact that there are less ethnic minorities, who are also highly 
regionally concentrated, in Lithuania creates less salience in regard to the ethnicized party 
system. Lithuanian electoral design is much more viable for highly concentrated minorities. This 
explains the success of the Poles in the recent elections, and the lesser extent of salience of the 
ethnicized system explains why the Poles have been welcomed into the left coalition government 
in 2012.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
I explored the extent of party system institutionalization in Lithuania and Latvia in terms 
of a continuum of party system stability. I have explained that the reasons for the fluctuations in 
terms of party system stability are caused by the degree coalitions that are able to retain power 
over time and the degree to which ideological balancers remain relevant within the party system. 
Both are shaped by the extent of how salient the ethnicization of the party system is and the 
electoral system, and thus either exacerbate party system instability or make a party system more 
stable. The significance of the ethnic divide as a politicized tool is stronger in Latvia because of 
higher salience of ethnicization and electoral rules that differ from Lithuania. The ethnic 
minority parties have dominated the left, thus leaving the titular citizens the many available 
choices within the right and the centre-right. The higher degree of competence in terms of post-
Soviet voters, for the ethnic minorities the choice was clear, the Russian-speaking left parties, 
while for the titular citizens the many parties in the centre-right translated into the ability for the 
voters to punish the incumbents through economic voting. This led to a lack of party rootedness 
that then caused party extinction, and hence greater seat volatility. Seat volatility improved in the 
last election because of the retention of coalitions among the right and the centre-right parties 
anchoring the as much as powerful Harmony Centre party. Both parties the rightist and the 
leftists, thus, form an ethnic divide. Seat volatility in Lithuania is high due to the turnover 
between the two political ideologues initially. Post-2000 elections it began a trend toward a 
decrease because of a greater usage of coalition governments. If we exclude the seat volatility in 
Lithuania that occurred because of ideological turnover of parties, Latvia has a greater seat 
volatility due to greater overall party system instability. When we take in context seat volatility 
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as a part of measures for party system stability. My research has shown that the degree and 
salience of ethnicization of a party system and the electoral system matters, for ethnically 
divided societies, in terms of impacting the party system ideological balance and coalition 
retention over time, both of which impact party system stability.  
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